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In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient 
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In this paper we show that making use of intergenerational transfers can be neces-
sary and suﬃcient to achieve a Pareto improvement if otherwise non-internalizable
intragenerational externalities exist. In order to generate intragenerational external-
ities that are not a consequence of an ad-hoc restriction of the set of admissible
mechanisms, we use an environment with asymmetric information. For this class
of problems the realization of intragenerational gains from trade — or, what is the
same, the internalization of intragenerational externalities — is not trivial because
mechanisms cannot be directly contingent on the information parameters of the
problem. Our argument that intergenerational transfers can improve the allocation
is based on the relaxation of participation constraints that hold if a generation tries
to implement a potentially Pareto-improving mechanism. Although it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd externalities that have no intergenerational component in practice, a number of
externalities in production and consumption mostly aﬀect adults in their working
age. It is therefore worthwhile to analyze the limiting case in which intergenerational
components do not exist.
To be more speciﬁc, suppose that individuals can take actions that aﬀect —
through some arbitrary channel — the wellbeing of other individuals in the same
generation. While the actions are observable, the types that may, for example, de-
termine the psychic and monetary costs associated with these actions are private
information. A government tries to implement a mechanism which induces every in-
dividual to take an action that yields in combination an eﬃcient allocation. However,
the implementation of a mechanism has to ensure that everybody is at least as well
oﬀ as in a reference allocation without this mechanism. This requirement does not
create a problem if individuals are suﬃciently similar. With eﬃciency gains approxi-
mately equally distributed, everybody is willing to pay a lump sum that ﬁnances the
incentive payments of a direct mechanism. Having a more diﬀerentiated population
often implies a situation in which some individuals have a rather low willingness
to pay for achieving a proposed eﬃcient allocation. In the asymmetric information
framework, these individuals cannot be identiﬁed ex ante and compensated accord-
ingly. Consequently, some types earn information rents, and the maximum lump
sum that can be collected may not cover the expenses for the incentive payments in
full. As a result, the transfer mechanism is not feasible if it has to be self-ﬁnancing.
1Intergenerational transfers from the young to the old can close the gap between
necessary expenses and the maximum revenue that can be collected without harming
anyone in the old generation. This can take the form of a pay-as-you-go pension
entitlement for the old being contingent on actions taken during their working life,
a ﬂat pension beneﬁt, or public debt in general. However, the problem to ﬁnance
the budget deﬁcit of the mechanism arises again for the young who may face the
same structure of intragenerational externalities as in the predecessor generation and
who, in addition, have to be compensated for the transfer they have given to the
old. It is shown that the resulting scheme of intra- and intergenerational transfers
is sustainable if the economy exhibits a positive growth rate and if, in addition, this
growth rate exceeds the growth rate of the minimum budget deﬁcit necessary to
achieve eﬃciency.
Our contribution adds a new argument to the literature dealing with the Pareto-
improving role of intergenerational transfers. This literature has put forward four
lines of argument to show that intergenerational transfers may be necessary to
Pareto-improve the allocation of an intertemporal economy.
The ﬁrst argument is based on the dynamic ineﬃciency of an overlapping-
generations economy if individual preferences for old-age consumption are suﬃ-
ciently strong. High rates of private savings may imply a capital stock that is too
high. Channelling savings away from the capital market is thus a means to make
every generation better oﬀ (Samuelson, 1958).
Second, in an economy with exogenous interest rate intergenerational transfers
play the role of a chain letter. As long as some type of transversality condition is
not violated and no last period exists, intergenerational transfers can make every
generation better oﬀ (Spremann, 1984).
Third, Merton (1983) argues that if the risks on capital and labor markets are
not perfectly and positively correlated, it may be useful to introduce some element of
pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced intergenerational redistribution in order to eﬃciently hedge
risks.
Fourth, intergenerational externalities, for example in the form of human capital
investments between parents and children (Peters, 1995; Kolmar, 1997; Sinn, 2000),
in the form of technological externalities because of increasing returns to scale (Wig-
ger, 2001), or in the form of the exploitation of a non-renewable resource create a
suﬃcient argument in favor of intergenerational transfers. In each case intergenera-
2tional gains from trade exist. These gains can be captured by implementing a scheme
in which the older generation receives a pay-as-you-go pension as a compensation
for sacriﬁcing consumption opportunities during the working period in favour of the
younger generation. Intergenerational transfers are necessary to achieve a Pareto im-
provement because the generation that has to make the sacriﬁce would inevitably be
worse oﬀ if it changed its incentive scheme as to internalize the externality without
transfers.
Our contribution may be seen as turning around an argument from the debate
on Pareto-improvements by abolishing a pay-as-you-go scheme being ﬁnanced by
distortionary taxation (Breyer, 1989; Homburg, 1990; Fenge, 1995; Brunner, 1996).
Gains for each generation may be realized by getting rid of static ineﬃciencies that
would not exist without the pay-as-you-go scheme. Conversely, in our framework it
is the introduction of the pay-as-you-go scheme that enables the economy to remove
externalities. Hence, abolishing it can create static ineﬃciencies that could otherwise
be internalized.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we intro-
duce the basic model of intragenerational externalities in a economy characterized by
intertemporally segregated generations and a structure of asymmetric information.
Section 3 describes the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations and ﬁrst-best mechanisms
that induce one of these allocations. Subsequently, section 4 discusses participation
constraints and presents a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which a self-
ﬁnancing ﬁrst-best mechanism is no longer feasible. Section 5 analyzes the issue of
sustainability when both intragenerational and intergenerational transfers are used
to achieve a ﬁrst-best allocation. After discussing an example in section 6, the ﬁnal
section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time model in which we have a sequence t =1 ,... of peri-
ods. In every period of time there lives a number mt of individuals, constituting
generation t. Our assumption that generations do not overlap represents a reduced
form of a standard overlapping-generations framework in which no intergenerational
spillovers exist except for potential transfers. This convention is used in order to keep
the notation as simple as possible. Focusing on intragenerational externalities, we
3stress that choices of individuals do not aﬀect previous or succeeding generations.
In an extension, we borrow from the standard overlapping-generations model the
property of possible transfers from younger to older generations. In every period t,
an individual i =1 ,...,m t is characterized by her type θ
t
i ∈ Θt
i ⊂ R. This type is her
private information. Denote by θ









element of the set of potential type proﬁles Θt =Θ t
1 ×...×Θt
m. For convenience we
assume that the type determines the utility function of an individual, U(.,θ
t
i). The
probability distribution governing nature’s choice of types is common knowledge.
Every individual can choose an action at
i from a set of possible actions At
i. The
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is the collection of action sets in period t. The utility of an individual depends both




mt}∈Bt = Rmt of a storable private good. This formulation of an
allocation problem allows for a very general structure of spillovers and types of
goods that are traded within the economy. Virtually any type of intragenerational
interdependency between individual actions and utilities can be interpreted as a
special case of the above speciﬁcation, ranging from perfectly rival to perfectly non-
rival goods.
In our basic setup, we abstain from intergenerational transfers. This implies that





i =0 ,t =1 ,.... (1)













In accordance with the literature on mechanism design, the utility function is as-
sumed to be additively separable between at and tt
i and linear in the latter argument.
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which generates convenient monotonicity properties (Milgrom, 2004).
4In the following we analyze the case that generations are intertemporally sep-
arated. This means that the choices made by members of generation t have no
impact on the economic environment or the number of individuals in period t +1
or any other future period. In addition, we assume that intergenerational trans-
fers are absent in the initial situation prior to the implementation of an eﬃcient
mechanism. In this reference allocation individual i in period t achieves a utility
level of UM
i (θ






t)}. This initial situation can have various interpre-
tations. In a positive interpretation of the model it can range from anarchy to a
private-property economy, or any form of a more explicit institutional structure
that generates a potentially ineﬃcient outcome. In a normative contractarian inter-
pretation of the model, it can be a situation of ideal equality under a veil of ignorance
(Rawls, 1971). Irrespective of the precise interpretation of this initial situation, it
leads to a vector of reservation utilities for every individual in each generation. This
vector speciﬁes a minimum acceptance point for every individual in the sense that
every allocation that generates a lower level of utility can be blocked.
To summarize, an economy is characterized by {mt,U,UM,Θt,A t,Bt}t=1,....
3 Pareto-eﬃcient allocations and direct mecha-
nisms
We start by a characterization of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations. First note that the set
of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations can be found by the maximization of the unweighted
sum of utilities because of the assumption of quasi-linear utilities. The case of in-
tertemporally separated generations is particularly easy to solve because the in-
tertemporal optimum {at,b t}t=1,... can be derived by the separate solution of each
period’s optimal policy {at,b t} for the case of symmetric information.
Recalling the budget equation (1), the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation for every

























In general, the optimal choice of at will be a function of θ
t because otherwise
5the type would be irrelevant. Denote by at∗ = at∗(θ
t) such an optimal solution and
by P(θ
t) the maximum sum of utilities. The linear terms b∗(θ
t) are indeterminate
within a certain range and will be used to control incentives.
We are looking for conditions under which intergenerational redistribution is
necessary and suﬃcient for a Pareto improvement. It is therefore necessary to as-
sume that every generation chooses an institutional structure that is as eﬃcient as
possible, given that no transfers between generations occur. Any argument in fa-
vor of intergenerational redistribution that is not based on an inevitable friction of
the intratemporal problem is ad hoc in the sense that a better organization of the
intratemporal allocation problem would be an alternative to intertemporal redistri-
bution.
In order to implement at∗ the society can use a period-t mechanism Mt = {St,f}
that assigns strategy sets St = {St
1,...,St
mt} to every individual i =1 ,...,m t in
period t and a mapping f : St → (at,b t) that selects a choice vector at for any given
vector of strategies st.W ec a l la na l l o c a t i o n(at,b t) Bayesian implementable if it is
a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game induced by mechanism Mt.
We know from standard implementation theory that every choice vector at that
can be implemented by an arbitrary mechanism can also be implemented by a direct
mechanism Mt
d = {Θt,(at,b t)} (Mas Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). Because
we want to focus on the role of intergenerational transfers under ideal institutional
structures we will therefore restrict attention to optimal direct mechanisms in the
following.
Our analysis follows the approach of Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) who con-
trary to most of their predecessors ﬁrst look at conditions under which the incentive
compatibility constraints are fulﬁlled and then analyze the participation constraints.
This way of dealing with the problem is analytically easy to handle and is more ade-
quate to our problem than the alternative approach to assume that the participation
constraints are fulﬁlled and then check for the incentive compatibility constraints.
We will ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient direct mechanism. In the next sec-
tion we investigate the conditions under which a Pareto-improving implementation
of this mechanism is or is not possible. The latter case deﬁnes necessary conditions
for the Pareto-improving role of intergenerational transfers. In order to complete
our argument in favor of intergenerational transfers we ﬁnally have to characterize
conditions under which a scheme of intra- and intergenerational transfers is also
6sustainable.
Denote by Et[.] the non-contingent expected value and by Et
i[.] the contingent ex-
pected value of [.] for a given type θ
t
i, i =1 ,...,mt. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of
the direct mechanism Mt































i ∀ i =1 ,...,m
t.
It is now straightforward to characterize the properties of an eﬃcient direct mecha-
nism. In order to implement at∗(θ
t), individuals need to have an incentive to reveal
their true type θ
t
i.



























i is a constant.
Proof. Compare the condition for an eﬃcient allocation (4) with the individual
condition for rational behavior in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, (5). Recalling the
utility function (2) then shows that both problems coincide if and only if bt fulﬁlls







































by construction. It can easily be veriﬁed that the class of eﬃcient mechanisms is
unambiguously determined except for the constant terms γt
i (see D’Aspremont and
Gérard-Varet, 1979). ￿
Lemma 1 states that the transfer is equal to the sum of the expected action
utilities of all other individuals plus a constant. This rule ensures that everybody
acts so as to maximize the sum of all expected utilities.
74 Feasibility without intergenerational transfers
Without intergenerational transfers the budget constraint
￿mt
i=1 bt
i =0h a st ob e
fulﬁlled. In order to ﬁnd out whether the ﬁrst-best mechanism is feasible without
relying on external resources, we have to check if the constant terms γt can be chosen
so as to balance the budget. Denote by Dt(γt) the expected deﬁcit of the eﬃcient
mechanism with constant terms γt.I fγt
1 = ... = γt
mt =0 , the expected deﬁcit is
equal to
















Hence, an eﬃcient mechanism can be implemented without intergenerational trans-
fers if and only if the sum of constant terms γt, multiplied by −1, is not smaller










































i =0 . (9)
Assume that the reservation utility of individual i in the case that the mechanism
is not implemented is equal to UM
i (θ
t). The precise speciﬁcation of this reservation
utility depends on the status quo alternative that is used as a benchmark for the
evaluation of the implementation of an eﬃcient mechanism, as being discussed in
section 2. Since the qualitative nature of our argument does not rely on the numerical
values of the UM
i (θ
t), we do not have to specify the economic environment that
generates them. However, we will analyze the allocation of a private good in a
private-property economy as an example in section 6. The assumption of private
property will then generate an explicit value of the reservation utilities.
Given this framework, Proposition 1 describes the necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for being able to implement a ﬁrst-best allocation without intergenerational
transfers.































8holds in every period, it is possible to implement an intertemporally eﬃ-
cient allocation without intergenerational transfers.
Proof. The implementation of an eﬃcient mechanism Mt
d is Pareto-improving


























i cannot be contingent on θ
t
i because of the asymmetry of information,

















































holds, it is possible to implement an eﬃcient mechanism without intergenerational
transfers. ￿
Proposition 1 indicates under which condition intergenerational transfers may
be useful to achieve a Pareto improvement. Notice that the threshold values Mt
i will
typically be negative if the sum of the expected action utilities is positive, and vice
versa.
Condition (11) restricts the lump-sum payments that can be imposed on an
individual from above. If the condition stated in Proposition 1 is violated, it is
no longer possible to arrive at a ﬁrst-best allocation by means of a self-ﬁnancing
mechanism. Of course, this does not exclude a Pareto-improvement compared to
the reference allocation through some other self-ﬁnancing mechanism.
The feasibility problem is in fact a result of asymmetric information. The next
proposition demonstrates that in a world with symmetric information the ﬁrst-best
allocation can be achieved without intergenerational transfers.
Proposition 2: With symmetric information implementing a ﬁrst-best
allocation is feasible without relying on intergenerational transfers.
9Proof. With symmetric information, type-contingent transfers γt
i can be used.







































































































This latter condition is always satisﬁed with strict inequality because gains from the
coordination of actions exist. ￿
Proposition 2 is easily understood. If information about the individuals’ types
is symmetrically distributed, diﬀerentiated lump-sum payments can be used. It is
then possible to design the transfer structure such that everybody gets exactly her
reservation utility while the ﬁrst-best action vector is induced. Such a scheme will
be associated with a budget surplus because internalizing the externalities at a bal-
anced budget must lead to a higher sum of expected utilities. The arising budget
surplus can then be distributed to make everybody better oﬀ. With asymmetric
information, many individuals may receive unavoidable information rents if a mech-
anism is implemented in order to achieve a ﬁrst-best allocation. As a result, the gain
in aggregate utility may not be suﬃcient to ﬁnance these rents.
5 Sustainability with intergenerational transfers
We know from the above analysis that a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation can be reached
only if the transfer rule (6) is fulﬁlled in all periods. Recalling that Lemma 1 de-
scribes the set of eﬃcient direct mechanisms, the question as to whether it is actually
possible to implement a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient allocation is answered by ﬁnding out if
10γt can be set such that (12) is fulﬁlled. Depending on the structure of the intra-
generational allocation problem, (12) may or may not be fulﬁlled if information is
asymmetrically distributed. If the gains from trade from the implementation of an
eﬃcient mechanism are suﬃciently large for all realizations of types θ
t, we can expect
that the implementation of an eﬃcient mechanism is in fact a Pareto-improvement.
However, it is easy to construct examples where this condition is not satisﬁed. For
example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that it is impossible to reach
eﬃciency in a situation of bilateral trade with private property rights if gains from
trade exist in expectation, but not for every realization of types. If such a situation












be the minimum external amount of resources that would be necessary to create
a Pareto-improvement by implementing an eﬃcient mechanism in generation t.I n
general, ¯ Wt depends on the nature of the allocation problem, the preferences of the
individuals, and the size of the population. In the following we extend our basic
model of intertemporally separated generations by allowing for transfers from any
younger generation t+1to its predecessor generation t. This can be done by simply
reinterpreting (2) as representing the indirect utility function of the standard over-
lapping generations model where the individual has already optimized her savings
behavior.




to its predecessor gen-








Intergenerational transfers can hence make it possible to implement an eﬃcient




t−1),t =1 ,.... (16)
Neglecting the asymptotic behavior of W(.) such a transfer scheme is possible to
implement in principle (see Spremann, 1984). The problem is to construct a scheme
11which is sustainable. For a ﬁnite time horizon, a ﬁrst-best mechanism is called sus-
tainable if it is possible to cover all budget deﬁcits. If we have an inﬁnite time
horizon, the corresponding condition is that public debt per capita converges to
zero. Our notion of sustainability is of course very narrow. It is also conveivable to
call a scheme sustainable if debt per capita does not exceed a ﬁnite threshold or
even if the ratio between public debt and GDP does not exceed some ﬁnite num-
ber. However, neither alternative is a generalization of the requirement in the ﬁnite
horizon framework that all debt has to be repaid.
In the following, we implicitly assume that transfers do not alter production
in the economy. Thus, a budget surplus can only be stored. In order to keep the
analysis as simple as possible, we exclude the option to invest such surpluses in order
to generate some additional output in the next period. This amounts to setting the
interest rate to zero.
Assume that the intergenerational transfer mechanism is ﬁrst to be implemented
in period t =1and that a transfer ¯ W 1 is ﬁrst paid to generation 1 by generation
2. We can easily derive the necessary and suﬃcient condition for being able to
implement a ﬁrst-best mechanism when the economy ceases to exist at the end of
period T.
Proposition 3: For every ﬁnite time horizon T a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for the implementation of a ﬁrst-best mechanism in every





i=1 ¯ W i ≤ 0.
Proof. According to (16), the minimum intergenerational transfer suﬃcient to







Noticing this condition, the claim is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of
a sustainable scheme. ￿
Proposition 3 states that deﬁcits in some periods have to be at least compensated
by surpluses in other periods. Otherwise, it is impossible to cover every budget
deﬁcit that arises between the ﬁrst period t =1and the last period T. Given that
the nature of the allocation problem and the preferences of the individuals do not
12change over time, this condition can only be fulﬁlled if there is either positive or
negative population growth. With a constant population size and ¯ W t > 0 for some
t, the deﬁcit ¯ W t is constant and positive in all periods. In the next section we will
present an example of an economy with only private goods in which ¯ W t decreases
in mt. The following corollary is an immediate implication of Proposition 3.
Corollary:There exists no Pareto-improving introduction of a sequence
of transfers {W t}t=1,...,T = {
￿t
i=1 ¯ W i}t=1,...,T with ¯ Wt  =0f o ra tl e a s t
one t that implements a ﬁrst-best mechanism in every period.
Proof. Every minimum deﬁcit ¯ W t > 0 in an arbitrary period t has to covered by
a subsequence of surpluses ¯ Wτ < 0, τ ⊂{ 1,...,T}. In these periods τ it would have
been possible to implement an eﬃcient mechanism without any transfers. Hence,
any transfer ¯ Wτ < 0 reduces consumption in period τ, which implies that at least
one individual is worse oﬀ compared to the status quo. ￿
Hence, with a ﬁnite time horizon, it is impossible to make every individual in
each generation better oﬀ by introducing intergenerational transfers. While a Pareto-
eﬃcient allocation may be achieved by implementing the scheme of intra- and in-
tergenerational transfers, a generation that is a net payer can even do better in the
absence of the intergenerational transfer scheme. In that case it can implement a
ﬁrst-best allocation for its members and leave the full period budget surplus for their
consumption.
Next we focus on an inﬁnite time horizon. The gross intergenerational transfer
in the receiving generation is w(θ
t)=W(θ
t)/mt per capita. We start by considering
the situation in which the population grows at a constant rate µ = mt+1/mt −1 ∀ t
and the minimum deﬁcit ¯ W grows at a constant rate η ∀ t. Proposition 4 collects
the conditions under which debt per capita converges to zero.
Proposition 4: With an inﬁnite time horizon and constant growth rates
of the population and the period budget deﬁcit, implementing a ﬁrst-
best mechanism in every period is sustainable if and only if the rate of
population growth, µ, is both positive and higher than the growth rate of
the deﬁcit, η, that is, µ>0 and µ>η .
Proof. With a constant population growth rate and a constant minimum-deﬁcit
growth rate, population at time t is equal to mt =( 1+µ)t−1m1, and the aggregate
13minimum deﬁcit at time t can be expressed as W t =
￿t
i=1 ¯ Wi = ¯ W 1((1+η)t−1)/η.





(1 + η)t − 1
η(1 + µ)t−1 (17)
if η  =0 , and wt =( t ¯ W 1)/(m1(1+µ)t−1) if η =0 . The claim then follows immediately
from considering limt→∞ wt. ￿
Since aggregate debt increases steadily irrespective of the growth rate of the
deﬁcit, a positive rate of population growth is necessary for having a debt per capita
that converges to zero. Should the growth rate of the budget deﬁcit be positive, an
even higher growth rate of the population is necessary and suﬃcient for reducing
debt per capita period per period.
Propositions 3 and 4 have some obvious implications for the more general scenar-
ios without constant growth rates. For example, if the growth rate of the population
is always positive and higher than the growth rate of the deﬁcit, debt per capita will
converge to zero. In contrast, if the population does never increase and the budget
deﬁcit is always positive, the intergenerational transfer scheme is not sustainable.
Of course, as it will also turn out in the example in the next section, ¯ W t is
in general a function of the population size, ¯ W t = ¯ W(mt). Again, we can draw
some obvious conclusions by recalling Propositions 3 and 4. Debt per capita will
converge to zero if population increases at a minimum growth rate µmin > 0 while
at the same time the function ¯ W is non-increasing. With an increasing function
¯ W, the intergenerational transfer scheme is sustainable if in every period the rate
of population growth exceeds the growth rate of the deﬁcit. Further, a shrinking
population may go along with a sustainable scheme if we have budget surpluses for
small populations and budget deﬁcits for large populations. If the deﬁcit is positive
for all population sizes, a constant or shrinking population can never imply that
debt per capita converges to zero.
6 Example with private goods
In this section we illustrate the above argument by means of an example. We assume
that a private (that means rival and excludable) good is traded and that private
property exists, which determines the reservation utility of each individual.
14Assume that at every point of time t there is a potential seller of an indivisible
unit of a private good, called individual 1. This individual has with probability 1/2 a
utility of consuming her good that is equal to 1, and with probability 1/2 a utility of
consuming her good that is equal to 0. There are mt −1 ≥ 1 potential buyers of the
good with utilities of a or (1+a), a ∈ (0,1), and probabilities 1/2, 1/2 respectively.
The utilities represent types, and the random draws are independent of each other.
Each individual learns her type before trade takes place, but not the types of the




i ≤ 1, the act of trading the
good with individual i at t. Normalizing the utility in case of no consumption to





















for individuals i =2 ,...,m t.
As in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), the problem is to implement a mecha-
nism that induces every individual to reveal her type and at the same time satisfy
the governments’ budget constraint. Intuitively, the mechanism has to avoid a sce-
nario in which agents are not willing to engage in mutually beneﬁcial trade. This
may happen if they can rationally expect to get better terms by not agreeing to
the proposed price and continuing the bargaining process. An eﬃcient mechanism




m}. Given this surplus the expected deﬁcit



















The maximum transfer Mt
i that individual i is willing to accept without generating
a conﬂict with its participation constraint is equal to
M
t


























2mt−1 (1 + a) (21)




























2mt−1 (1 + a) (22)
for individuals i =2 ,...,m t. Hence, the intergenerational net transfer that is neces-






































− 1)(1 + a)m
t. (23)
It is straightforward to check that the sign of this condition depends on a as well
as on mt. The locus ¯ W(θ
t)=0is given by a monotonically decreasing and convex
function a(mt), with a<a (mt) implying that ¯ W(θ
t) > 0. Two results from the
literature emerge as special cases. First, for mt =2we get ¯ W(θ
t)=( 1− a)/4 > 0.
This is the famous impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) who
were the ﬁrst who have shown that bilateral trade is necessarily ineﬃcient for small
groups of traders. Second, for mt →∞we get limmt→∞ ¯ W(θ
t)=−a<0, which
replicates the result by Gresik and Sattherthwaite (1989) who have shown that the
ineﬃciency vanishes if the number of potential traders increases. Hence, there is
no need for intergenerational transfers in our example if the economy is suﬃciently
large.
On the other hand, if a<a (mt) holds, balancing the budget is only possible by
means of intergenerational transfers. However, in a growing economy, mt+1 >m t ∀t
it is always possible to ﬁnd a non-exploding scheme. Noting that mt+1 ≥ mt +1
in this case, the range in which a>a (mt) is valid will be reached in ﬁnite time.
Therefore, there exists an intergenerational transfer scheme from the young to the
old that allows the implementation of a Pareto-eﬃcient mechanism in every period
16t if T is suﬃciently large. If T →∞a Pareto-improving transfer scheme always
exists.
7 Concluding discussion
We have demonstrated that implementing a ﬁrst-best allocation in an environment
with asymmetric information and only intragenerational externalities can require the
use of intergenerational transfers. Since the self-ﬁnancing constraint of the mecha-
nism cannot be satisﬁed, additional funds are needed. These funds are provided
by the succeeding generation, which can be achieved by setting up a pay-as-you-go
pension scheme. Of course, if an alternative source for receiving the additional gov-
ernment revenue is available as, for example, borrowing from abroad, the problem
may also be solved without making use of pay-as-you-go pensions or some similar
arrangement. However, if government borrowing on a perfect capital market is con-
sidered, it should be noted that the debt will never be repaid by the generation that
receives the beneﬁts. Otherwise, future tax payments will be taken into account
such that the additional funds today do not contribute to relax the participation
constraints. If future generations have to pay back the internal or external public
debt, the transfer scheme is virtually identical to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme.
A sustainable scheme with a per-capita debt converging to zero requires a growing
population if a budget deﬁcit arises in every period.
The proposed scheme can also work in a shrinking economy, which may be char-
acterized by a negative population growth rate. An eﬃcient allocation in all periods
can, for example, be achieved when we have budget surpluses in smaller economies.
With budget surpluses in some periods, at least one generation of net contributors
can improve its position by abolishing the transfer scheme. When the notion of sus-
tainability is relaxed by allowing for some ﬁnite per-capita debt in the limit or a
positive maximum debt-output ratio, a growing population may no longer be nec-
essary for a sustainable scheme with budget deﬁcits in every period. If we allowed
for growing labor productivity, a constant or even declining population can go along
with an increasing aggregate output over time.
If the proposed scheme is not sustainable, using some resources from intergen-
erational transfers will generally harm at least one of the succeeding generations.
However, the typical situation in practice will be that achieving a ﬁrst-best alloca-
17tion in one generation involves some elements of intergenerational spillover in the
sense that it enlarges the production capacities in the next generation. As already
stated at the outset, such a component of intergenerational spillover would already
necessitate intergenerational transfers.
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